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amount of spending on players relative to the rest of the league, a team that hires a better 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is now an extensive literature on determination of managerial and CEO pay, much 
of it driven by analysis of the classic principal-agent problem in modern firms. Prendergast 
(1999) surveys a variety of research on the general issue of personnel and organizational 
responses to alternative incentive mechanisms. In particular, Conyon and Murphy (2000) 
examine the relative sensitivities of CEO pay to company performance in the US and UK. 
Schwalbach and Graßhoff (1997) and Kraft and Niederprüm (1999a; 1999b) perform com-
parable analyses using data from German companies. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
address the question of the extent to which relative performance evaluation determines 
CEO salaries. The position of CEO salaries within company wage structures has also been 
considered. For instance, Conyon et al. (2001) test hypotheses from tournament theory us-
ing British company data, showing that company wage structure is indeed highly convex 
across top echelons of management. The relationship between different forms of corporate 
governance and executive pay has received attention in a number of papers (e.g. Conyon et 
al. (2001) and Hallock (2002)).  
 
This research typically concerns the impact of company performance on managerial salary, 
traced through theoretical impacts of incentive mechanisms on managerial effort. The re-
verse relationship between managerial quality and organizational performance has received 
far less attention. This is not surprising. The data requirements needed to properly separate 
out substitutability and complementarity amongst the host of inputs to firm outputs in 
complex, modern organizations are usually too great to overcome and the risk of omitted 
variable bias is bound to be high. Employer-based surveys have questions that are often 
too broad to permit a focus on detailed technological and behavioural relationships be-
tween organizational inputs and outputs. Case studies using personnel records in particular 
companies are helpful but results do not necessarily generalise.  
 
As Kahn (2000) has persuasively argued, the sports industry is a useful sector within which 
to test interesting hypotheses in the area of personnel economics. In professional team 
sports, organizational goals and outcomes are much clearer than in most other sectors. 
Teams usually wish to maximise sporting performance given available resources with which 
to acquire playing and managerial talent. Increased sporting performance usually translates 
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into higher revenues and profits for team owners. In North American team sports in par-
ticular, there exists a plethora of individual performance and salary data often publicly 
available on the internet. In Europe, where soccer is easily the dominant team sport, such 
data have more restricted availability.   
 
A general principle that can be applied to most sports leagues is that teams that pay higher 
total salaries for their playing rosters relative to the league average will, on average, achieve 
better performance. Performance can be measured by percentage of games won or points 
achieved. In European soccer, owners and fans are likely to respond to position in the 
league rankings since particular positions have further implications such as qualification to 
higher level European competition. Empirical support for the general upward sloping rela-
tionship between relative team salaries and team performance has been found, using a 
number of performance metrics and across a variety of sports leagues, in North America 
and Europe, by Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Szymanski (2000; 2003), Simmons and 
Forrest (2004) and Kahane (forthcoming). 
 
Even in the sports sector, studies showing the impact of managerial quality on organiza-
tional performance are sparse and limited in coverage. Some literature focuses on coaching 
efficiency of sports teams as part of a more general treatment of team efficiency (e.g. Porter 
and Scully (1982), Hadley et al. (2000), Dawson et al. (2000), Hautsch et al. (2001), Poulsen 
(2000), Audas et al. (2002), Salomo and Teichmann (2002), Koning (2003) and Kahn 
(2004)). This literature lacks direct evidence on coaching remuneration.  Again, this is 
largely due to lack of available data.  In the case of English soccer, the league studied by 
Dawson et al., the only wage data available for use as an input to team production was total 
wage bill for the entire staff of the club. As the authors acknowledge, this total wage bill 
measure conflates influences of player and coaching salary on team performance.  Even the 
pioneering study of managerial quality effects in Major League Baseball by Kahn (1993) 
was hampered by only having a single season’s data for managerial salary (this also applies 
to Kern and Süssmuth (2003)). Generally, coaching salaries in North American sports are 
publicised far less than individual player salaries.  
 
Our focus in this paper is on European soccer, specifically the top tier of German soccer 
(henceforth Bundesliga 1) for which head coach salary data are publicly available. Within 
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European soccer, the head coach takes primary responsibility for training and selection of 
playing personnel and all on-field team decisions including playing strategy and tactics. 
Credit for team success and, conversely, blame for failure will usually reside with the head 
coach, often accompanied by intense media scrutiny.  Normally, the head coach in Euro-
pean soccer is not directly involved in issues relating to player contracts. However, he will 
usually be closely involved in recommending which players to hire and fire and which play-
ers to be rewarded in contract extensions and renewals.  
 
The global reach of European soccer teams and mobility of labour mean that the market 
for head coach talent can be thought of as competitive. The supply of head coach talent is 
best considered as upward sloping in salary-talent space. Head coaches arrive to teams 
through various routes but it is conventional to be a former professional player1 and possi-
bly to have served as an assistant coach prior to appointment as head coach. A recent trend 
in European soccer, following the internationalization of playing talent, is the increased 
appearance of foreign-born head coaches in the major leagues of England, Germany, Italy 
and Spain.  
 
In such a highly competitive market, where managerial skills are easily transferable, we can 
expect that salaries of coaches will closely approximate marginal revenue products. In a 
global soccer market, monopsony power becomes irrelevant. Therefore, given an upward 
sloping supply curve in salary-talent space, managerial salary should be a good proxy for 
managerial talent. Given expenditure on team wage bills, increased spending on head coach 
salaries ought to imply acquisition of a higher level of managerial talent. However, the 
league is a competition which sorts teams into ranks (league standings); in order to make 
progress in terms of league position teams need to acquire increased playing and managerial 
talent relative to league norms. Increased expenditure on managerial talent, relative to league 
average should translate, on average, into improved team performance. It is not obvious 
that this hypothesis will be supported by evidence. If managerial talent is homogeneous 
and pay dispersion across head coaches is very low then the impact of managerial pay on 
team performance will necessarily be small.  
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The central question addressed in this paper using German soccer as a particular case is: 
does variation in managerial quality affect organizational performance? It is possible that 
the sole influence on team performance is spending on player wage bill relative to the league 
average (Simmons and Forrest, 2004). Then head coaches are just ciphers translating pre-
existing player talent into on-field success or failure. Likewise, in many modern organiza-
tions, a CEO could simply be a figurehead with no active defining role. Folklore from 
within European soccer suggest this is not the case: head coaches matter in terms of organ-
izational and motivational ability. The most successful head coach in our sample is Ottmar 
Hitzfeld who obtained considerable success at Borussia Dortmund and Bayern Muenchen, 
leading these teams to a total of six domestic championship titles and each to a Champions’ 
League trophy. Not surprisingly Hitzfeld had the highest relative salary in each season dur-
ing his most recent spell with Bayern Muenchen. If a significant role can be found for head 
coach quality in determination of soccer team performance then one may conjecture that 
there is potential for impact of executive quality on organizational performance to be re-
vealed in other industry sectors. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review our data and esti-
mation methods. We follow two complementary econometric procedures: stochastic fron-
tier estimation and fixed effects panel data estimation. These apply a points ratio measure 
and league rankings, respectively.  Section 3 displays our stochastic frontier results while 
Section 4 switches attention to findings from fixed effects model. Section 5 concludes.     
 
2.  Data and Estimation Methods 
 
Our data come from a Sunday newspaper (Die Welt) that publishes team wage bills and 
head coach salaries immediately before the start of a season. These data span 22 seasons 
from the inception of Bundesliga 1 in 1981/82 through to 2002/03. Supplementary data on 
team playing records were obtained from Kicker soccer magazine. With the single exception 
of 1991/92, Bundesliga 1 contains 18 teams2. Since 1992/93, at the end of each season the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1  However, it is certainly not essential to have been a high-profile star as a player in order to be a successful 
head coach. Currently, some of Europe’s most successful head coaches were not successful players e.g. 
Mourinho at Chelsea who was only an amateur player.  
2  In 1991/92, following unification of East and West Germany, the top two teams from the first division of 
the former German Democratic republic were admitted to Bundesliga 1 and the number of teams was 
 6
three lowest placed teams are demoted and replaced by the three highest placed teams from 
the second tier, Bundesliga 23. One particularly notable structural change in German soccer 
is the change in number of points awarded for a win from two to three installed in 1995/96 
largely as an incentive to encourage more attacking, entertaining play.    
 
These data give us an unbalanced panel of 398 team-season observations featuring 39 
teams. Six of these (Bayern Muenchen, Werder Bremen, Borussia Dortmund, Hamburger 
Sportverein, Bayer Leverkusen and VfB Stuttgart) have appeared in Bundesliga 1 over the 
entire sample period; five clubs (Blau-Weiss Berlin, Darmstadt 98, VfB Leipzig, Kickers 
Offenbach and SSV Ulm) were relegated after just one season.  
 
Some descriptive information on team wage bills and head coach salaries is shown in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. These are kernel density plots which show skewed distributions of team wage 
bills and head coach salaries even when scaled by season league averages. However, the 
extent of skewness in team wage bills is actually less than in other European soccer leagues 
(Simmons and Forrest, 2004). Dispersion and skewness are both features of the kernel 
density plot of head coach salaries suggesting that managerial talent is heterogeneous and 
that there is some potential for differences in head coach relative salary to affect team per-
formance. 
 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for a 
set of firms indexed by i over a number of periods t can be represented as: 
 
Yit = xitβ + (vit – uit)               i = 1,…..N; t = 1,….T                                   (1) 
 
where Yit is the natural log of output , xit is a vector of inputs, also in logs and β is a coeffi-
cient vector to be estimated4. The remainder of the equation is an error term comprising 
                                                                                                                                                                          
temporarily increased to 20. At the end of the 1991/92 season, four teams were relegated to Bundesliga 2 
while only two were promoted, restoring the traditional league size of 18.  
3  Prior to 1991/92, a two game playoff between the team placed 16th in Bundesliga 1 and the team placed 
3rd in Bundesliga 2 settled, by aggregate score, one of the places in Bundesliga 1 for the subsequent sea-
son. 
4  We also estimate a more flexible translog functional form. 
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two parts. vit is a random error term with standard iid properties. uit is a non-negative ran-
dom error term assumed to follow a normal distribution truncated at zero; this last term 
captures potential inefficiencies in production. If these are found to be zero in estimation 
then we can revert to standard econometric procedures to estimate a production function 
with panel data. But if these inefficiencies are found to be significantly different from zero 
then production function estimates that assume efficiency could well be biased.  
 
The estimated technical inefficiency terms could themselves be correlated with a further set 
of explanatory variables. This possibility was explored by Battese and Coelli (1995) and a 
study from professional sports that follows this two-stage approach is Kahane (forthcom-
ing). Assume that uit has a distribution truncated at zero and given by ~N(mit, σu2). Mean 
inefficiency can be modelled as a function of specific firm-level influences by : 
 
mit = zitδ + wit                                                                                      (2) 
 
 where zit is a vector of firm-specific influences on inefficiency in firm i in period t and δ is 
another vector of coefficients to be estimated. The error term wit is assumed to be ~N(0, 
σw
2) truncated at - zitδ for consistency with the assumption that uit is non-negative and trun-
cated at zero. 
 
In our case, ‘output’ is given by log of end-of-season points as a ratio of maximum possi-
ble, LOG REL POINTS. Included in xit are measures of relative team wage bill, LOG REL 
WAGEBILL and relative head coach salary, LOG REL SALARY, each scaled by league 
averages in any given season. Since the change in points regime has the effect of lowering 
mean points ratio (from 0.5 with two points per win to 0.45 for three points per win) we 
also include a dummy variable THREE POINTS to indicate seasons covered by the new 
points regime.  
 
In the second stage of the model, we have five covariates. Two measures reflecting mana-
gerial ability that might conceivably impact on technical inefficiency are coach experience 
(number of seasons experience as head coach in the Bundesliga, COACH EXP) and coach-
ing win-loss records (proportion of possible points earned as head coach, COACH WIN). 
Each of these measures would be predicted to reduce technical efficiency as they are in-
 8
creased. This is largely due to selection and sorting; the least efficient managers are likely to 
be identified through their poor performance, given the playing resources available to 
them, and consequently fired5.  
 
Teams that are promoted may, even allowing for lower wage bills, struggle to compete ef-
fectively in the top tier of soccer as they adjust to new playing surroundings, new teams and 
different playing styles and strategies at the higher level. We might predict that promoted 
teams face a learning curve as they adjust to the higher level of soccer. Learning effects are 
incorporated by the variable SPELL which is the number of seasons in Bundesliga 1 that 
have accrued since last promotion. Therefore a team like Hamburger Sportverein which 
has never been demoted has a value of SPELL that is equal to number of seasons that the 
Bundesliga 1 has been in existence. A team such as SSV Ulm which only has one season in 
the Bundesliga 1 has a spell value of one.  
 
Managerial turnover in European soccer is rather frequent. In Germany, single-case head 
coach dismissals occur in a total of 118 out of 398 team-season observations; there are an-
other 23 cases of two or three dismissals6. A team that fires its head coach during the sea-
son is denoted by the dummy variable DISMISS 1 while the less common occurrence of 
two or more head coach departures within a season is captured by DISMISS 2. The under-
lying reasons for coach dismissal are not explored here, although poor team performance is 
the usual proximate cause. All we seek to capture is the unsettling impact of head coach 
departure on team organization and morale through team inefficiencies. We predict that 
head coach dismissals will be associated with increased team inefficiency specifically as a 
current season impact7.  
                                                          
5  We should stress that it is technical inefficiency rather than absolute level of performance which is the key 
variable in the second stage of our model. Absolute ability should be reflected in the head coach’s salary. 
A head coach can be associated with a low level of performance yet be highly technically efficient accord-
ing to our econometric evidence. Conversely, a head coach could be associated with a high level of per-
formance yet be technically inefficient. In the former case, a coach is highly likely to be fired due to direc-
tor and fan (mis-)perception of incompetence, In the latter case, the head coach might receive an unduly 
high level of praise. Such anomalies have surfaced in some stochastic frontier models of European soccer 
team performance (e.g. Dawson et al. 2000).  
6  It should be stressed that these are dismissals and not voluntary quits. 
7  In dismissing a head coach during the season a team could have two views on the likely gains. One short-
term view is that the change in head coach is a quick fix which can quickly restore life to an ailing team. 
Game-level empirical evidence from European soccer suggests only limited short-term improvement in 
match results (e.g. Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003, on Dutch soccer). Alternatively, teams may take a 
longer view and assess that a new head coach can bring better performance in the future even though cur-
rent performance may be disappointing. A team may be judged to be already condemned to relegation 
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Equations (1) and (2) can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1993) and made available in Coelli’s (1996) computer program FRON-
TIER 4.1. The maximised log-likelihood function gives estimates of σ2 and γ where σ2 = σv2 
+ σu2 and γ = σu/(σv2 + σu2). The γ parameter is particularly important as it shows the propor-
tion of sum of the two error variances that is accounted by technical inefficiencies. If this 
parameter is not significantly different from zero then we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of zero technical inefficiencies and we would revert to standard panel data econometric 
procedures to estimate our team production function.  
 
Fixed effects estimation with endogenous coach salary 
 
One problem with our stochastic frontier model lies with our choice of team output meas-
ure, points attained divided by maximum possible. Although league points and league 
standings will be highly correlated, a particular points ratio can translate into different 
league positions in different seasons. Winning the Bundesliga title will entail a different 
number of points to be achieved in any season depending on how close the competition 
for the title becomes. Likewise, retention of Bundesliga 1 status (i.e. avoiding relegation) 
will also entail a different number of points again contingent on number of teams involved 
in a relegation struggle in any season. Club directors and fans are more likely to respond to 
league standings and what these deliver in terms of team achievement than points ratios.  
 
To model league standings we propose the logistic transformation of position, given by 
LOG ODDS POSITION set equal to – log (position/(n+1 – position)) where n is total size 
of Bundesliga 1, currently 188. The logistic form implies that a movement between adjacent 
league positions carries greater weight, and higher implied effort to achieve, higher up the 
league rankings.  
 
Currently in Germany, particular positions imply particular categories of team achievement. 
The highest is winning the Bundesliga 1 title. However, this also ensures qualification to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
due to poor performance under a dismissed head coach and fortunes may be judged to improve eventu-
ally under a new appointment (see Höffler and Sliwka 2003). Borland and Lye (1996) argue, with evidence 
from Australian Rules football, that two teams could significantly improve performance by swapping head 
coaches as the switch could generate a better match for each team, given particular team and coach char-
acteristics. 
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the more prestigious European Cup and its successor, the UEFA Champions’ League. The 
UEFA Champions’ League currently includes the top three teams from Bundesliga 1. Entry 
to the Champions’ League secures, as a minimum, enhanced gate, broadcasting and spon-
sorship revenues and potential for lucrative prize money if German clubs progress in the 
competition9. Lower down, another group of teams qualifies for the UEFA Cup. This is 
still a prestigious tournament but with lower levels of prize money and less allure than the 
Champions’ League10. Normally, the Bundesliga sends four teams (those placed 4th to 6th 
plus domestic Cup winner) to the UEFA Cup. Teams which do not qualify for European 
competition will aim to avoid relegation, which is the fate of the bottom three teams. 
 
Teams that spend more on team wage bills are also likely to spend more on head coach 
salaries. In our sample, the correlation coefficient between relative wage bill and relative 
head coach salary is 0.62. In order to identify the impact of head coach, we instrument rela-
tive head coach salary using COACH EXP, COACH WIN and SPELL. The first stage of 
our instrumental variables model with team fixed effects is: 
 
Log relative coach salary = a0 + a1*Log relative wage bill + a2*Coach points ratio + 
a3*Coach experience + a4*Spell + a5*Dismiss 1 + a6* Dismiss 2 + team fixed effects + et 
           (3)  
 
The fitted values from this equation Predicted relative coach salary are then entered into the 
second stage where: 
 
Log odds position = b0 + b1*Predicted relative coach salary + b2*Log relative wage bill 
+ b3*Dismiss 1 + b4* Dismiss 2 + team fixed effects + εt    (4) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8  The standard metric for North American sports team performance is percentage of games won. Log odds 
of league position is applied in some empirical work on European soccer leagues (e.g. Szymanski (2000)).  
9  Recently the Champions’ League trophy was won by Borussia Dortmund (1996/97) and Bayern Muen-
chen (2000/01). 
10  The Champions’ League begins as a set of leagues of four teams from which the top two proceed to a 
knock-out phase played over one home and one away game and settled, sequentially aggregate score or 
highest number of away goals scored if the aggregate goals are level or penalty shoot-out if both aggregate 
and away goals are each level. The ruling giving  higher implicit weighting to away goals was introduced to 
provide greater incentive to away sides to pursue less defensive play. Teams that are eliminated from their 
Champions’ league groups are still entitled to compete in the UEFA Cup by entering part way through 
the competition. Hence, some teams can actually enter both competitions in the same season.   
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3.  Stochastic Frontier Estimates 
 
Table 2 reports stochastic frontier estimates. Our dependent variable is log points ratio and 
the production function has a Cobb-Douglas form11. The coefficient γ is positive and sig-
nificant at the one per cent level. Hence team inefficiencies are important in explaining 
variations in points ratios and we therefore reject estimation of a standard production fron-
tier in favour of a stochastic frontier model. The elasticities of points ratio with respect to 
relative wage bill and relative coach salary are 0.211 and 0.045, significant at one per cent 
and five per cent levels respectively. The higher elasticity for player wage bill is not surpris-
ing: no matter how good the motivation and tactical awareness of the coach, it is the play-
ers who perform on the pitch. Their relative importance in team production is greater than 
for the head coach.     
 
Our production function exhibits diminishing returns to both relative wage bill and relative 
coach salary and decreasing returns to scale in team and head coach talent, as proxied by 
salaries. According to these estimates, acquiring better managerial talent by raising relative 
head coach salary by 100 per cent, e.g. taking relative coach salary from one to two, can 
raise total points from a mean of 49 to a new total of 51. This may seem rather small but 
we should stress that it is achieved with no change in total playing talent, as measured by 
relative wage bill, and with other teams also striving to obtain improved managerial quality. 
As we shall see below, such a difference in points may turn out to be crucial for achieving 
particular club objectives such as qualification for European competitions or avoiding rele-
gation.  
 
Acquiring a head coach with a better record, measured in terms of career points ratio 
achieved, has the further beneficial effect of reducing team inefficiency. This is shown in 
the sign and value of the parameter δ2. This is negative and significant at the one per cent 
level suggesting that a higher coach career points ratio reduces technical inefficiency. In 
contrast, the insignificant δ1 parameter shows that for given coach career points ratio, hav-
ing greater managerial experience is not associated with reduced inefficiency. Quite rea-
sonably, experience of winning dominates experience per se as the key managerial character-
                                                          
11  The more flexible translog form was tested and rejected due to jointly insignificant coefficients on 
squared and cross-product terms. 
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istic which helps improve technical efficiency and move the team towards its potential out-
put. 
 
The other δ parameters are all statistically significant at the one per cent level. The signifi-
cantly negative δ3 parameter shows that a team that has enjoyed a longer continuous spell in 
Bundesliga 1 than a rival will, ceteris paribus, enjoy reduced inefficiency. This possibly reflects 
a cumulative learning experience for clubs with prolonged tenure in the top division of 
German soccer. In contrast, recently promoted clubs have smaller values of SPELL and 
hence greater inefficiency scores.    
  
A team that loses one head coach in a season will suffer increased technical inefficiency 
with a bigger effect if the club goes on to lose two or even three head coaches. Given the 
turbulence that usually surrounds a head coach departure this is to be expected, although 
the departure may itself reflect some underlying problems such as loss of customer (fan) 
support, financial failure and lack of co-operation between team-mates. This does not im-
ply that firing head coaches is irrational as teams may believe that long-term gains (by ac-
quiring a better head coach) will outweigh short-term losses of efficiency.  
 
The stochastic frontier estimates show the relative importance of head coach quality and 
reveal an important role for head coach quality in moving teams closer to their production 
frontiers. However, points ratios do not translate easily into particular team objectives and 
use of league rankings, through log odds of position, can help give further insights.  
 
4.  Two Stage Least Squares Estimates 
 
Table 3 reports our two stage least squares estimates of equations (3) and (4)12. In the rela-
tive coach salary equation, the coefficient on coach experience is significant at one per cent 
while the impact of coach career points ratio on relative salary is not significantly different 
from zero. We also find that teams which have longer current tenure in the German top 
division spend more on head coach salaries relative to the divisional average; an increase in 
                                                          
12  Estimations using Generalised Two Stage Least Squares, following Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishmaku-
mar (1987). See Baltagi (2001) for a general discussion of panel data models with endogenous regressors. 
We applied our instruments to relative wage bill as the endogenous variable but coefficients on both rela-
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spell is associated with higher relative coach salary.  These results reflect the selection and 
sorting mechanism in the coaches’ labour market, identified in team sports by Borland and 
Lye (1996) in the market for head coaches in Australian Rules football using duration 
analysis. More generally, this is an example of assortative matching identified in the per-
sonnel economic literature (Prescott, 2003).  
 
In our context, the best head coaches will be the most experienced since these have passed 
the test of quality by survival. They will be attracted to the most durable Bundesliga teams 
(Bayern Muenchen or Borussia Dortmund, for example) which have the greatest potential 
for winning domestic and European titles and which have longer current tenure in the 
Bundesliga. In order to attract these valuable head coaches, teams must pay more than the 
league average. Coaches that have high career points ratios for their teams tend to be more 
likely to survive as head coaches in Bundesliga 1. Those coaches with poorer points records 
will be fired. The career points effect is then subsumed under the effect of experience and 
this accounts for the lack of significance of the coefficent on coach career points ratio. 
 
In the second stage of the model, both relative wage bill and predicted head coach salary 
influence log odds of position, with coefficients significant at one per cent. Teams with 
higher predicted relative head coach salary or higher relative wage bill are expected to 
achieve higher league positions. In contrast, teams that lose one or more head coaches in a 
season will obtain lower league positions. We should stress that our two-stage model im-
poses the plausible restriction that an increase in relative team wage bill cannot raise league 
position on its own; any increase in relative wage bill must be accompanied by higher rela-
tive coach salary. This restriction, which is supported by the data, captures the essential 
technical complementarity of head coach and player abilities. Coaching and player talent are 
then Edgeworth complements as defined by two key characteristics. First, an increase in 
use of player talent raises the marginal valuation of coaching talent. Second, more player 
talent is optimally accompanied by increased head coach talent.   
 
Table 4 shows some simulations of changes in relative head coach salary and relative wage 
bill required to achieve particular targets within the league. These simulations are based on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
tive coach salary and predicted relative wage bill were insignificant at the 5 percent level. This reinforces 
our choice of relative coach salary as endogenous to our instruments. 
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our estimates in Table 3. Holding relative wage bill constant, the first column shows the 
extra head coach relative salary required to win the league title, beginning with second 
place. This turns out to be a dramatic increase taking the relative head coach salary to a 
value that is only just within sample range.  Not surprisingly, a team can better achieve this 
target by investing in both player talent and head coach talent. Lower level achievements 
can, however, be obtained by improving relative spending on the head coach, holding 
player relative wage bill constant. The second column, first row, shows the increase in rela-
tive wage bill that would be needed, according to our model, to win the title and the final 
column shows the implied change in relative head coach salary that would accompany such 
a change. In the case of moving from second to first, the required increase in relative wage 
bill is again large. The required increments in relative head coach salary and relative wage 
bill are of course much greater at the top end of the league because of the logit transforma-
tion of position adopted here13.  
 
Further down the league, we see less dramatic changes in relative head coach salary and 
relative wage bill that could bring about entry into either of the European tournaments or 
avoidance of relegation. For example, an increase in relative wage bill from 1.06 to 1.34, 
combined with small increase in relative head coach salary from 1.08 to 1.11, is sufficient to 
gain UEFA Cup entry, starting from seventh place. To avoid relegation, a team could find a 
better quality head coach by raising its relative spending from 0.77 to 1.35 and keeping 
spending on relative wage bill constant at 0.71. Alternatively, the club could invest in the 
playing squad by raising player expenditures to just beneath the league average (0.98) and 
raising head coach quality by increasing relative spending from 0.77 to 0.88, still below the 
league average. Essentially, to improve league performance the club owners must decide on 
a combination of extra spending on managerial talent and extra spending on the playing 
squad. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Our modelling exercise in this paper produces several key results. First, the stochastic fron-
tier estimates showed that extra spending on managerial talent vested in a head coach has 
                                                          
13  This simulation abstracts from the negative impact on league position that would occur if the team were 
to fire an existing coach prior to hiring the coach of better quality. As such, the simulation is best consid-
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the impact of pushing the team production frontier outward in points ratio-relative wage 
bill space. The elasticity of this relative head coach salary effect is much smaller, however, 
than the elasticity of relative player wage bill. If a more successful coach can be hired, then 
we find that the team’s technical efficiency is improved. Better managerial quality, proxied 
here by coach career points ratio, can move a German soccer team closer to its production 
frontier. We attribute this result to a sorting and selection mechanism. Those coaches with 
best winning records have the greatest potential to extract improved performance out of a 
given pool of playing talent, thereby improving efficiency.  This result is worth investigat-
ing further in other contexts. The literature on CEO salaries would benefit from considera-
tion of appropriate CEO career records so as to examine of the impact of changes in CEO 
quality on movements towards production frontiers.  
 
We also found that longevity in the top tier of the Bundesliga produced greater technical 
efficiency, a result that we associate with learning experience. The Bundesliga is a highly 
competitive structure with guaranteed entry each season and it is clear that, in this context, 
established teams cannot and do not settle for comfort and inefficiency. Further, coach 
dismissals are associated with reduced technical efficiency although presumably this can be 
offset by hiring a new coach who has a better winning record than his predecessor.  
 
In our instrumental variables fixed effects model we identified technical complementarity 
of playing and managerial inputs. Relative head coach salary was successfully instrumented 
by coach career experience. Implicitly, coaches with greater experience are paid higher sala-
ries, a reasonable result reflecting acquisition of more human capital through learning.  
 
Our instrumental variables model shows that, generally, investment in player talent through 
higher relative wage bill needs to be accompanied by some investment in coaching talent if 
teams are to progress up the league. Sometimes, though, holding relative spending on play-
ers constant and hiring a better quality coach can be a plausible route to success although 
most likely not in terms of winning the league title. 
 
The best head coaches arrive and stay at the top clubs in German soccer through a process 
of matching and sorting. We defer an explicit analysis of matching and selection models in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ered as a prediction of changes in equilibrium talent levels for players and coach. 
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sports to further research but our results would seem to be consistent with assortative 
matching in the market for head coaches. Given an upward sloping supply curve for mana-
gerial talent, more ambitious clubs offer higher managerial salaries in order to hire a more 
talented head coach. However, the competitive structure of the league is such that the extra 
spending must be relative to the rest of the league and not just absolute. If a club succeeds 
in hiring and retaining a better quality head coach and is then able to back this investment 
up with extra relative spending on player talent then the club can improve its performance.  
 
From both stochastic frontier modelling and instrumental variables estimation, we find that 
relative spending on playing talent and on head coach talent combine effectively to reduce 
technical efficiency and improve league performance. Players and head coaches need each 
other and we find strong evidence from both our modelling approaches of complementar-
ity between player and head coach inputs to team success. The best teams hire the best 
head coaches and the best playing talent and relative expenditures are good proxy measures 
for talent in our sports league setting. The literature on personnel economics would benefit 
from further examination of such complementarities in other settings. 
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Figure 1: 







































Descriptive Statistics for Bundesliga Teams: 1981/82 to 2002/03 
(n = 398) 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Team inputs     
Relative wage bill 1.000 0.533 0.230 4.147 
Relative coach salary 1.000 0.507 0.226 3.079 
Head coach measures     
Coach career points ratio 0.435 0.215 0 0.850 
Coach career experience 4.37 4.82 0 27 
Team measures     
Spell 7.17 6.06 1 22 
Dismiss 1 0.296 0.457 0 1 





























Table 2:  
Stochastic Frontier Estimation of a Cobb-Douglas Production Function for 
Bundesliga 1 
 
Dependent variable is log points ratio. 
 
 Parameter Coefficient 
(t statistic) 
Team Inputs   
Log relative wage bill β1 0.211
(7.76) 
Log relative coach salary β2 0.045
(1.99) 
Three points β3 -0.105 
(5.45) 
Intercept β0 -0.399 
(4.93) 
Head Coach Measures   
Career Bundesliga games coached δ1 -0.116 
(1.94) 
Career points ratio δ2 -0.004 
(1.18) 
Team Level   
Spell δ3 -0.009 
(3.30) 
Dismiss 1 δ4 0.212 
(5.45) 
Dismiss 2 δ5 0.433 
(7.62) 
Inefficiency model intercept δ0 0.306 
(2.75) 
Variance parameters   
Total error variance   σ2 0.034 
(7.38) 
Proportion of error variance due to technical inefficiencies γ 0.764 
(4.49) 
Mean technical efficiency  0.759 









Instrumental Variables Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
Dependent variable is log odds of position 
 
 
Variable Relative coach salary Log odds position
Relative coach salary  0.682 
(2.27) 















Coach experience 0.036 
(8.63) 
 







Proportion of error variance due to  
fixed effects 
0.29 0.41 
Correlation between fixed effects and regressors 0.27 0.39 
F statistic for significance of fixed effects 4.00 2.49 
R2 (within) 0.34 0.31 








Changes in Relative Head Coach Salary and Relative Wage Bill  
Required to Raise League Position 
 
Change in Position Required Change in 
Relative Salary 
Required Change 
in Relative Wage 
Bill 
Implied Change in 
Relative Coach  
Salary 
2 to 1 
(Win League Title) 
1.48 to 3.31 1.47 to 2.65 1.48 to 1.95 
4 to 3 
(Qualify for Cham-
pions’ League) 
1.06 to 1.64 1.33 to 1.83 1.06 to 1.22 
7 to 6 
(Qualify for UEFA 
Cup) 
1.08 to 1.48 1.06 to 1.34 1.08 to 1.11 
16 to 15 
(Avoid Relegation) 
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